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AUSTRALIAN INSOLVENCY LAW AND THE 1992 ISDA
MASTER AGREEMENT—CATALYST, REACTION, AND
SOLUTION
Christopher J. Mertens†
Abstract: The reverberations of Enron’s financial collapse were heard on an
international scale. Indeed, Enron Australia’s liquidation set off a flood of concern and
speculation about the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s (“ISDA”) model
documentation for derivative transactions. A December 2003 opinion of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales exposed a flaw in the ISDA 1992 Master Agreement. Two
provisions of the agreement operate in tandem, creating a result which operates contrary
to the clear meaning of the terms. This volatile interaction of the provisions effectively
shifts the risk from the parties to the swap contract to the creditors of the defaulting party.
This unexpected result poses a real concern for the creditors of parties to swap or
derivative instruments governed by the 1992 Master Agreement. The ISDA has
articulated policy goals to maintain market stability and efficiency. As the drafter of the
model agreements, the ISDA has an ethical obligation to ensure that the terms of the
agreement operate according to their clear meaning. Otherwise, the parties can best
address the Agreement’s deficiencies by taking notice and contracting around them.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2003, the Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Australia, decided a case involving the rights of an insolvent party under an
electricity swap contract. 1 The court held in that case, Enron Australia
Finance Pty Ltd v. TXU Electricity Ltd, that it did not have authority under
Australian insolvency law 2 to alter the terms of the swap contract to force
the non-insolvent party, TXU Electricity (“TXU”), to pay the net amount

†
The author would like to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editorial staff, Mr. Jay
Lardizabal for introducing me to the case, and Professor Sean O’Connor for his instructive comments.
Furthermore, the author thanks all of his friends and family for their love and support.
1
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266 (N.S.W.). An
electricity swap contract is an agreement between two parties where one party agrees to pay the market rate
and the other agrees to pay a fixed rate over the period of the agreement. Periodically, as agreed to by the
parties, the difference between the market rate and the fixed rate is paid to the party owed. See INT’L
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html. Parties generally enter into a number of such agreements, or
“confirmations,” under the overarching non-economic terms of the Master Agreement. See infra Part II.
2
Australian insolvency law with respect to corporations is codified in Chapter Five of the
Corporations Act, 2001. Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5.
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owed in the event that TXU chose to terminate the agreement.3 The New
South Wales Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision in full.4
Under the court’s interpretation of Australian corporate insolvency
law, 5 the International Swap and Derivative Association’s (“ISDA”) 1992
Master Agreement (“Master Agreement”) 6 effectively allows TXU to walk
away from the contract,7 despite the fact that the parties elected a provision
that disallows them to walk away from their obligation.8 The outcome of the
case exposed terms in the Master Agreement that interact to operate contrary
to the plain meaning.9 The risk of loss that TXU assumed under the Master
Agreement was transferred to the creditors of Enron Australia in liquidation,
depriving them of the value from the Master Agreement and relieving TXU
of any potential payment obligation.10 In order to reduce the potential for
systemic collapse, give effect to the Master Agreement’s terms as written,
and remain consistent with the ISDA’s underlying policy goals, there must
be some mechanism to provide for the Master Agreement’s termination.11
Those involved in derivatives markets in which courts can determine
the enforceability of contractual provisions under insolvency and bankruptcy
laws 12 have noticed the Enron Australia decision.13 This case is significant
3
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 77. For an explanation of close-out netting, see infra
Part II.A.
4
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd, (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12.
5
See infra Part IV.
6
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 1992 Master Agreement (Multicurrency – Cross
Border) [hereinafter 1992 Agreement]; see discussion of the ISDA’s background infra Part II.
7
Gary Walker & Guy Usher, Good Law—Serious Implications: Enron Australia v. TXU Electricity,
19 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 414, 415 (2004); see infra Part IV.
8
By selecting the Second Method, and not selecting the First Method, both parties implicitly agreed
that walking away would not be an option for the defaulting parties; see discussion infra Part V.B.
9
See infra Part V.B.
10
See infra Part IV.C.
11
See infra Part V.B.
12
Courts that traditionally have the power to determine and alter the enforceability of contracts in
the event of insolvency are located within countries with historic ties to English bankruptcy law, including
England, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
13
See, e.g., Bad News for Insolvent Counterparties – 1½ Way Payments Under ISDA Master
Agreement?, ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, FOCUS: BANKING AND FIN., Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/baf/fobaffeb04.htm [hereinafter AAR] (discussing the consequences of the
case from an Australian perspective); Robert Scavone et al., Some Further Thoughts on Enron Australia v.
TXU: Putting the ISDA “Flawed Assets” Clause in Perspective, MCMILLAN BINCH, DERIVATIVES BULL.,
Dec.
2004,
available
at
http://www.mcmillanbinch.com/Upload/Publication/enron%20v%20
australia%201204.pdf [hereinafter MCMILLAN BINCH] (discussing the potential outcome and significance
of the case under Canadian Law); Jeremy D. Weinstein, et al., Escape From the Island of the One-Way
Termination: Expectations and Enron v. TXU, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2004, at 1
(discussing the potential outcome and significance of the decision under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code);
Jeremy Carter, FSA Asks Bank of England to Review Aussie Ruling, DERIVATIVES WEEK, July 23, 2004,
available at http://www.derivativesweek.com/default.asp?page=1&SID=424923&ISS=10644 (noting the
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because end users of varying sophistication enter into derivative contracts
both for hedging and investing purposes.14 Additionally, there is a growing
concern regarding the obligations of private entities that draft model
transactional documents.15 The Master Agreement’s subversive operation is
also inconsistent with the accounting and disclosure of swap and derivative
transactions.16
While reactions have been varied,17 the case highlighted a potentially
unanticipated outcome under the ISDA Master Agreement; one that leaves
an aftertaste of inequity. In the interests of maintaining market stability and
the transparency of risk allocation among parties to swap contracts governed
by the Master Agreement, the ISDA should amend the agreement to allow
for its timely termination in the event of one party’s liquidation. The ISDA
has an interest, and perhaps even an obligation, to ensure that the default
outcome under the Master Agreement is clear from the express language and
terms, and to protect the derivative instrument as an asset in a defaulting
party’s liquidation.
This Comment argues that the ISDA has assumed a role of
responsibility for the stability of the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives
market. It is likewise in the interest of this privately regulated multinational
industry to maintain market stability through the clear operation of the terms
of the Master Agreement. The ISDA thus has both an obligation to amend,
and interest in amending, the model documentation to provide for clear
operation of the model agreements. Part II provides background to the ISDA
and select provisions of the 1992 Master Agreement. Part III briefly
explains a debtor’s contractual rights under Australian insolvency law. Part
IV examines the Enron Australia opinion and the inequitable risk transfer
under the Master Agreement from the non-defaulting party to the defaulting
party’s creditors. Part V examines the potential effects of, and issues raised
potential and serious implications of the Enron Australia decision, and the impact on English regulatory
law).
14
See, e.g., Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance
Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1035 (1994) (noting that even school districts are utilizing
derivatives in an effort to control financial risk); William J. Bergman et al., Netting, Financial Contracts,
and Banks: The Economic Implications 30 (Aug. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, FRB of Chicago
Working Paper No. 2004-02), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/
wp2004-02.pdf (discussing the use of credit derivatives by financial institutions).
15
See infra Part V.
16
See infra Part V.B.
17
Compare Carter, supra note 13 (noting that the Bank of England’s Financial Markets Law
Committee was reviewing the impact of the Enron Australia decision on regulation of capital netting for
regulated financial institutions), with Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the outcome of the
case “enforced a contract as written in a manner close enough to what must have been intended”).
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by, this decision in comparison with the underlying purpose of the ISDA
Master Agreement. Part VI argues that derivative market participants should
be made aware of the operation of the Master Agreement in the event of the
insolvency of an in-the-money party in order to contract around the outcome
demonstrated in Enron Australia. The ISDA, however, is best suited, and
perhaps obligated, to resolve any undesired outcomes under the Master
Agreement.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION
MAINTAINS MARKET STABILITY THROUGH PRIVATE REGULATION

The ISDA is a private international regulatory corporation which
drafts model contracts, lobbies local governments for correct rules, and
works to maintain market stability. 18 In 1992, it created the 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement, a model agreement for parties entering into multiple
OTC derivative transactions.19 The Master Agreement allows the parties to
engage in a series of less-formal transactions under the Master Agreement’s
overarching terms. 20 The Master Agreement sets forth all of the noneconomic terms of such transactions21 in order to increase the parties’ ability
to efficiently enter into swap transactions by merely setting the economic
terms, such as the price, amount, and period for each individual
transaction.22
The following is a brief introduction to four key concepts and
provisions within the 1992 Master Agreement relevant to the ISDA’s
regulatory ability, as it applies to the Enron Australia decision and this
18

INT’L
SWAPS
AND
DERIVATIVES
ASS’N,
ISDA
MISSION
STATEMENT,
http://www.isda.org/wwa/mission.html [hereinafter ISDA Mission]; ALLEN & OVERY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES: “TEN THEMES” 2 (May 2002) [hereinafter TEN THEMES],
http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/documentation_of_derivatives.pdf.
See ALLEN & OVERY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES 2-5 (May 2002), for a history of the ISDA
generally and the progression of the model instruments thereby developed.
19
TEN THEMES, supra note 18. OTC derivative transactions allow parties to more efficiently and
easily enter into transactions to meet the changing need to hedge risks in fluctuating commodity markets
and expected cash flows. DIETMAR FRANZEN, DESIGN OF MASTER AGREEMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 17
(2001). Over-the-counter derivatives are financial instruments negotiated by the parties to the instrument,
as opposed to listed derivatives available on an exchange. ROBERT A. STRONG, DERIVATIVES: AN
INTRODUCTION 5 (2002).
20
TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 1-2. Each separate transaction is recorded in a written instrument
known as a confirmation. Id. at 2. Each confirmation is made under the Master Agreement and together,
they are said to constitute a single agreement, all incorporated into the Master Agreement itself. 1992
Agreement, supra note 6, § 1(c).
21
FRANZEN, supra note 19, at 19; see, e.g., 1992 Agreement, supra note 6 (including procedures,
legal terms, definitions, default conditions, etc.).
22
TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 2.
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Comment. These concepts are essential to understanding how the terms of
the 1992 Master Agreement interact, and the variety of potential outcomes in
the event of one party’s insolvency. First, netting requirements are
imperative to determining each party’s risk when entering into each
individual transaction under the Master Agreement. This is also significant
to the outside creditors of the contracting parties. 23 Next, the Master
Agreement specifies several events of default, which have two major
implications: the non-defaulting party’s option to declare an early
termination date, 24 and a stay of the non-defaulting party’s payment
obligations under the Agreement 25 (also known as the “flawed-asset
provision”).26 The parties may also include additional termination events
that allow the parties to adapt the Master Agreement to the local
jurisdictional laws, or to temper the consequences to an insolvent party
under the Master Agreement.27
A.

Netting

Netting is a key concept within both the ISDA and international
markets as a whole. 28 The Master Agreement’s netting provision allows
each of the individual transactions entered into under the agreement to be
treated as a single transaction.29 At the time payments are periodically due,30
the netting provision offsets the amounts payable by each party, creating a
net amount payable.31 A significant consequence of parties’ ability to net
transactions arises when one of the parties has become insolvent.32 Without
23

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part. II.B. (discussing the right of the non-defaulting party to close out all outstanding
transactions upon the default of the counterparty).
25
See infra Part II.C. (explaining that as the periodic settling dates for the individual transactions
come due, the non-defaulting party’s obligations are stayed due to the existing event of default, also
referred).
26
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(a)(iii).
27
See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(b)(v); discussion infra Part II.D.
28
See TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4.
29
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 1(c).
30
On dates periodically specified by the parties, or as mentioned in the individual confirmations, the
amounts owed to each party are netted together, to create one amount payable by the party that is net “outof-the-money” to the party that is net “in-the-money.” See ROBERT W. KOLB, FUTURES, OPTIONS, AND
SWAPS 702-03 (4th ED. 2003); TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4.
31
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(c) (stating that the parties may elect to net the aggregate
amounts payable by each respective party across multiple transactions).
32
See TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4. Insolvency for the purpose of this statement means when
the counterparty is unable to pay the amount owed in a given transaction under the Agreement. Australian
law defines insolvency as the inability to pay debts as they become due. Corporations Act, 2001, pt.1.2,
div. 7, § 95A; see JOHN DUNS, INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICY 80-82 (Trischa Baker ed., 2002).
24
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an enforceable netting provision, an insolvent party attempts to collect the
amount owed to it from the non-defaulting party under one derivative
transaction. The insolvent party is simultaneously unable to pay its
obligation to the non-defaulting party under another transaction.33 A party’s
financial risk is decreased by allowing the financial obligations under the
Master Agreement to be netted. 34 Potential creditors consequently are
willing to provide credit on more favorable terms.35 Because netting allows
swaps to have smaller sums at risk, it permits a party entering into the
agreement to adjust the risk exposure by smaller increments when entering
into additional transactions.36
The systemic implications of netting are particularly apparent in the
event of insolvency. 37 Companies within a particular industry are often
engaged in a web of interrelated swap and derivative agreements.38 The lack
of a netting provision may create a chain reaction of recognized losses,
leading ultimately to systemic collapse of the particular market.39 The ISDA
has been particularly successful in obtaining legal opinions that affirmensure
33
The attempt to collect amounts owed while avoiding payment of amounts owed to the
counterparty is referred to as “cherry-picking.” TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4. While helping to
maximize the amount of funds available to pay the bankrupt party’s creditors, such “cherry-picking”
increases the risk of each party in the event of the other’s insolvency. See id.; Waldman, supra note 14, at
1059.
34
Close-out netting refers to the amount paid upon termination of all of the transactions under the
agreement, usually as a result of bankruptcy, insolvency, or another event of default. See discussion infra
Part II.B. The ISDA defines close-out netting as the combination of the credit exposure of each party to the
agreement into one amount payable by the party that is net in-the-money. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES
ASS’N, PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS NO. 30, http://www.isda.org/
educat/faqs.html.
35
See TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 4. Netting reduces the amount a party can lose in the event the
counter-party fails to make the expected payment. This increases the credit-worthiness of the party and
makes credit less expensive, because the credit provider’s exposure is lessened when extending credit to the
party.
36
See STRONG, supra note 19, at 319-20 (explaining that the amount at risk to a swap agreement is
in line with the net periodic payments made between parties, and not the entire payments to be made).
37
Thomas J. Werlen & Sean M. Flanagan, The 2002 Model Netting Act: A Solution For Insolvency
Uncertainty, BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L., Apr. 2002, at 154, 155-56.
38
See, e.g., id, at 156 (discussing the reduction of risk that netting provides to the banking and
finance industry, which commonly has participants in a web of credit derivatives).
39
See Bergman, supra note 14, at 30 (recognizing that close-out netting is an effective method of
reducing systemic risk). In terms of regulated financial institutions, the reduction of systemic risk has been
recognized as a justification for the right to close-out netting in the United States since the early twentieth
century. See id., at 11 (citing Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913)). But see Robert
R. Bliss & George C. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout (Apr. 8,
2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/files/sem_bliss
_kaufman.pdf (arguing that it is not clear whether netting results in a reduction of systemic risk). The gross
amounts at risk can be much larger than the net exposure, thus creating an important reliance on ability to
offset amounts owed when the purpose of entering into such agreements is to accurately hedge risks.
Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 154.
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the netting provision’s enforceability in credit derivative instruments under
the Master Agreement.40 It has also effectively lobbied jurisdictions to pass
statutory laws upholding contractual netting rights in the event of
insolvency.41 The Master Agreement would have little practical effect as a
useful risk management tool if the netting provisions were not recognized in
the relevant jurisdiction.42
B.

Events of Default and Early Termination

The Master Agreement specifically lists events which will result in the
default of a party to the agreement, 43 including circumstances beyond
traditional notions of contract breach.44 For example, section 5(a)(vii) of the
Master Agreement dictates that an event of bankruptcy will result in
default.45
A defaulting party does not necessarily implicate termination of the
Master Agreement. 46 A transaction that terminates prior to the natural
expiration date—as contracted for in each individual transaction—due to an
event of default or otherwise, is only subject to an early termination date.47
The non-defaulting party may choose whether and when to set an early
termination date.48 If the parties elect an automatic termination date upon
40
Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 157. Credit derivative contracts follow the same basic
ISDA Master Agreement structure, and are thus relevant to the present discussion. See Bergman, supra
note 14.
41
See Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 157. The ISDA’s model legislation is not limited to the
credit derivative market, and aims to uphold all contractual netting provisions in an effort to maintain
market stability. Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, 2002 Model Netting Act, pt.1, § 4.
42
Tamasin Little, Regulation by Non-Regulators, in ISSUES IN DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 27, 34
(Edward J. Swan ed., 1999).
43
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(a).
44
See, e.g., id. §§ 5(a)(iii)–(viii) (including merger without assumption of all obligations, and an
event of bankruptcy, in addition to material misrepresentations).
45
Id. § 5(a)(vii) (also including, for example, becoming insolvent, having an administrator
appointed, or a company becoming subject to an order of liquidation). For the purposes of this comment,
the discussion of events of default will be assumed to fall under an event of bankruptcy, as enumerated in
section 5(A)(vii) of the 1992 Master Agreement, particularly (5), there under, which states, “has a
resolution passed for its winding-up. . . or liquidation (other than pursuant to a consolidation, amalgamation
or merger)[.]” Id. § (5).
46
See id. § 6(a) (indicating that upon a continuing event of default, the non-defaulting party then has
a right to terminate the Agreement). This right or option to terminate may be subjected to limitation by the
parties to the contract. See id.; Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Schedule to the 1992 Master Agreement,
pt. I(e) [hereinafter 1992 Schedule] (allowing for parties to elect for an automatic termination upon selected
“events of bankruptcy,” as defined in Section 5(a)(vii) of the 1992 Agreement).
47
Id. § 6(a) (indicating that an “early termination date” includes termination following an event of
default).
48
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 19.
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the specifically enumerated events of default due to bankruptcy,49 the nondefaulting party does not have a right to elect termination of the transactions,
as this option ends the transactions automatically.50
The non-defaulting party considers a number of factors when
determining when and whether to elect an early termination date.51 If the
non-defaulting party is risk-averse, or changes in the market affect their
position adversely, the non-defaulting party would declare the termination
date as soon as possible to avoid any loss in position.52 Alternatively, the
non-defaulting party may choose not to declare an early termination date if
they are willing to risk that the market may move favorably in their
direction.53 In the event that the defaulting party is owed money by the nondefaulting party, it may be in the best interests of the non-defaulting party
not to declare an early termination date at all.54 Thus, more important than
the right to set an early termination date is the right not to.55
Parties to the Master Agreement have two main options for
designating an early termination date in the event of default56 as provided in
the Model Agreement: First Method and Second Method. 57 The First
Method allows a non-defaulting party to collect payment in the event they

49
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a) (setting forth the default events that may give rise to an
automatic termination).
50
See id., as elected by the parties in the Schedule. 1992 Schedule, supra note 46, pt. I(e). For a
further discussion of the automatic termination date, see infra Part VI.B.
51
See Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 3.
52
See FRANZEN, supra note 19, at 23. The declaration of the termination event solidifies the party’s
economic gain or loss. If it is a gain for the non-defaulting party it is submitted as a claim to the liquidation
of the defaulting party. In the event that the solidified amount is a loss to the non-defaulting party, then
payment is subject to the method elected. See Bergman, supra note 14, at 16-17 (regarding the insolvency
of financial institutions); see also infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
53
MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 4-5. If successful, a party could increase the amount of their
claim or decrease their liability to the defaulting party. Id.
54
This was the decision made by TXU in the case of Enron Australia’s event of default. See
discussion infra Part IV; Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 19.
55
See infra Part IV. Cf. Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266 (concluding that the non-defaulting
party indeed does not have to declare an early termination date, and cannot be compelled to do so by the
Australian courts).
56
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a), (e)(i).
57
Id. § 6(e). There are also two options for the method of determining the amounts owed: “market
quotation” and “loss.” See id. § 14 (defining “loss” and “market quotation”). As these distinctions have
little relevance to the present discussion, it is sufficient to note that “loss” is essentially the value of the
total loss and costs associated with the termination of the transactions as determined by the good faith
efforts of the parties to the agreement, while “market quotation” is the present value of the future
transactions that would have been paid based on prices set by principal market participants and marketmakers. See id.
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are in-the-money, 58 and pay nothing in the event they owe money to the
defaulting party. 59 The First Method is used less frequently, 60 but its
consequences to creditors of the insolvent defaulting party remain
important.61 The Second Method is the purported bilateral netting option,
which requires either party to pay the net close-out amount, regardless of
which party defaulted.62 This method is particularly important with regard
to the netting requirement, as it allows a party and its creditors the assurance
that payments will be available in the event of liquidation.63
Parties contracting under the Master Agreement have another option
regarding the termination of the transactions.64 The parties may elect for an
early termination date to be set automatically in the event that a party
defaults via a particular event of bankruptcy.65 This option may avoid any
question of whether a non-defaulting party should assume the risk and wait
before setting an early termination date. It also provides greater certainty to

58
A party to a swap instrument is in-the-money if, in the event of termination of the Agreement, that
party would be owed a net payment from the counterparty. This terminology comes from the valuation of
options. ROBERT A. STRONG, DERIVATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION 29 (2002) (stating that an in-the-money
option is defined as an option that has intrinsic value in that upon exercise the value will be higher than the
exercise price).
59
See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(e)(i)(1), (3).
60
See, e.g., Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 415 (noting that the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement
leaves out the First Method as an option). The First Method is not used for regulated financial institutions
as the capital adequacy requirements of most jurisdictions, per the Basle Capital Accord, do not allow for a
clause that allows a non-defaulting party to walk away from their obligations under the netting agreement.
See, e.g., FDIC Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. A (II)(E)(5)(b) (1999)
(adopting the exact language in the 1994 amendment to the Basle Capital Accord); Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority Guidance Note 112.3 (8)(f) (Sept. 2000) (netting agreements for Authorized Deposit
taking institutions may only be given effect in the absence of a walkaway clause). This disallowance is in
an effort to maintain systemic stability and encourage the efficient use of capital by financial institutions.
By not electing the First Method, institutions can theoretically count the amount expected under a netting
agreement as an asset in the event of insolvency, thus decreasing requisite capital reserve amounts, and
freeing up capital that may used more productively. Werlen & Flanagan, supra note 37, at 156; Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, The Treatment of the Credit Risk Associated With Certain OffBalance Sheet Items, pt. 2, para. 5 (July 1994).
61
See discussion infra Part V.
62
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(e)(i)(3) &(4).
63
See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 415. The Second Method was actually deemed to be
required for this very purpose of assurance via the 1994 amendment to the Basel Capital Accord. See Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 60, pt. II.
64
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a).
65
1992 Schedule, supra note 46, pt. (I)(e). Parties may elect to have the automatic early termination
provision apply to either or both parties. Id. Particular events of bankruptcy include dissolution of a
company, assignment to creditors, winding-up of the company, and the appointment of an administrator or
receiver, respectively. 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, §§ 5(a)(vii) (1), (3), (5), and (6).
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the defaulting party in the event of liquidation and allows for more expedient
and efficient winding up66 of the liquidating company.67
C.

Flawed Asset Provision

Parties under the Master Agreement are required to make payments
periodically as set forth in the confirmations of the individual transactions.68
The party’s payment obligations are subject to two conditions precedent.69
First, there must not be a continuing event of default by the counterparty.70
Second, there must be no declaration of an early termination date.71 Thus, if
one party is in default via insolvency or liquidation, then the counterparty’s
payment obligation is stayed as long as the defaulting condition persists.72 A
corollary logically follows—a party may cure a position of default, and
cause the suspended payment obligation to be revived, so long as an early
termination date has not already been set.73
While the mechanics of the flawed asset provision are very
straightforward in theory, in practice it is a controversial term. 74 Some
jurisdictions allow parties to avoid such provisions by statute, even voiding
the effectiveness entirely.75 Traditional freedom of contract arguments assert
that it would be unfair to allow an insolvent party to expect performance
under a contract when that party is unable to meet its contractual
obligations.76 When such provisions are upheld as enforceable in the courts,
freedom of contract proponents are pleased that parties may rely on the
66
“Winding up” is the process by which the assets are sold and creditors are paid in preparation for
the dissolution of a business organization. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
67
See infra Part VI.B.
68
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2 (a)(i).
69
Id. at § 2 (a)(iii).
70
Id. at § 2(a)(iii)(1).
71
Id. at § 2(a)(iii)(2).
72
See id. at §§ 2(a)(iii), 5(a)(vii); infra Part IV. See, e.g., Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU
Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 12 (Enron Australia’s continued insolvency continued to suspend
the payment obligation of TXU).
73
See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § (2)(a)(iii)(1); Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 12.
74
See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 414-15; MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 1.
75
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000) (allowing for the cure of defaults conditioned on bankruptcy, and
disallowing the alteration of terms, such as suspending performance, of a contract based on bankruptcy
proceedings).
76
See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 416. The operation of the flawed asset provision, if given
effect by the local jurisdiction, makes sure that the defaulting party derives no benefit from the contract, if
it is in fact in default. 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(a)(iii). See generally Alan Schwartz, Contracting
for Bankruptcy Systems, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 281, 286-87 (proposing that
parties should not be restricted from contracting about bankruptcy issues). The United States Bankruptcy
Code limits parties’ ability to contract about bankruptcy by allowing the debtor to cure default in
unexecuted executory contracts if default is based on insolvency or bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2000).
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terms contracted for. 77 An opposing viewpoint sees these provisions as
potentially unfair and in conflict with the bankruptcy system.78
D.

Additional Termination Events

Parties to the Master Agreement may elect to designate an additional
termination event in the schedule to the agreement.79 This allows parties to
set forth additional events in the Master Agreement’s schedule that result in
early termination. 80 Under the additional termination event provision, a
party may negotiate a clause that will give it greater control of ending or
liquidating transactions upon the occurrence of a specified event. 81 This
clause demonstrates that the Master Agreement is truly a set of default rules
that parties can contract around and adapt to their individual preferences
subject to the governing jurisdiction’s laws.82
III.

AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW IS MARKED
BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

A.

Background and Jurisdiction

BY

A

The Corporations Act of 2001 currently governs corporate insolvency
in Australia.83 General Australian corporations law represents a forty-year
movement toward a uniform federal body of law. 84 The Australian
Constitution provides no direct provision for giving federal jurisdiction over
corporations law.85 In reaction to the uncertainty of a uniform body of law
77

See Weinstein et al., supra note 17, at 4 n. 13
See generally Waldman, supra note 14 (noting generally that the ISDA Master Agreement has
largely been incompatible and in conflict with the United States Bankruptcy Code)
79
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(b)(v); 1992 Schedule, supra note 46, pt. 1(h).
80
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § §6(b). Termination events listed in the Agreement itself include
an illegality or the imposition of a new tax affecting the parties’ transactions. Id.
81
See, e.g., CLAYTON UTZ, ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT: EFFECTIVENESS OF “FLAWED ASSET”
CLAUSE – ENRON V. TXU, (March 29, 2005), http://www.claytonutz.com/areas_of_law/
controller.asp?aolstring=3&na=797 (discussing the additional termination event listed in the Enron
Australia Master Agreement that was originally designed to prevent unfair operation of the flawed asset
provision on the buyer of an option); see discussion infra Part V.A.
82
This raises the question as to whether Enron Australia, as a sophisticated party, should have relied
on the terms of the Master Agreement, or whether Enron Australia’s counsel failed to sufficiently consider
every possible outcome under the terms of the contract. See discussion infra Part VI.
83
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5 (Austl.).
84
See generally DUNS, supra note 32, at 4-6 (discussing the move of jurisdiction over corporate law
from the states and territories to that of the commonwealth).
85
2-14 COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INSOLVENCY GUIDE, pt. 14.01 (1) (MB) [hereinafter
COLLIER INTERNATIONAL]. But see Constitution § 51(xvii) (Austl.) (granting Commonwealth jurisdiction
78
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governing corporations, and in an effort to ground Commonwealth
jurisdiction over corporate law in the Australian Constitution, the States and
Territories agreed to refer their jurisdiction to the Commonwealth.86 The
States and Territories referred legislative jurisdiction to the Commonwealth
and accepted the Commonwealth Parliament’s legislation of the
Corporations Act 200187 as the current governing body of law for corporate
insolvency in Australia.88
Both the federal courts and the state or territory courts preside over
corporate insolvency matters,89 although state and territory supreme courts
resolve most corporate insolvency issues.90 Decisions of the Supreme Court
Judge sitting alone are appealed to the Supreme Court – Court of Appeal,91
before being appealed to the High Court of Australia.92

over individual bankruptcy law and proceedings); Constitution § 51(xx) (Austl.) (granting Commonwealth
jurisdiction over foreign corporations).
86
See Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001, § 1(2) (N.S.W.); Explanatory Notes to
Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Bill 2001, 1 (Queensl.). This allowed jurisdiction to be grounded in
the Australian Constitution, which allows the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate over areas of law that
the States and Territories have referred to the Commonwealth. See Constitution § 51(xxxvii) (Austl.).
87
Corporations Act, 2001 (Austl.). Each State and the Northern Territory passed identical
legislation referring legislative jurisdiction to the Commonwealth Parliament. See, e.g., Corporations
(Commonwealth Powers) Act, 2001 (N.S.W.) (relinquishing jurisdiction of corporate law to the
Commonwealth).
88
See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5 (Austl.). See generally DUNS, supra note 32. The Corporations
Act of 2001 was essentially substantively identical to the Corporations Act of 1989, except the former had
constitutional grounds for jurisdictional authority. Id.; see Corporations Act of 2001, ch. 1, pt.1.1, § 3
(Austl.) (basing jurisdiction on the referral of jurisdiction by the States and Territories, pursuant to
paragraph 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution).
89
See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 9, pt. 9.6A, div. 1, § 1337B.
90
See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.03(1). The State and Territory Supreme
Courts are the highest courts in the States and Northern Territory. However, this system is not as linear of
a judicial hierarchy as in the United States. See generally Mary Crock & Ronald McCallum, Australia’s
Courts: Their Origins, Structure and Jurisdiction, 46 S.C. L. REV. 719 (1995) (noting that unlike in the
United States, the Australian Commonwealth originally vested federal jurisdiction upon the lower state
courts until the 1960s). Civil cases in New South Wales involving amounts greater than $750,000 have
original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. See N.S.W. DEP’T EDUC. & TRAINING, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
NEW SOUTH WALES COURT SYSTEM, at http://www.schools.nsw.edu.au/sites/nswconstitution/
html/5th/bgr/overview.html [hereinafter COURT STRUCTURE].
91
Appeals from a decision by the Supreme Court are seen by a panel of three Supreme Court Judges.
COURT STRUCTURE, supra note 90.
92
Id. The High Court of Australia only hears cases by granting of petition to the Court. Crock &
McCallum, supra note 90, at 733.
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Voluntary Administration and Winding Up

Australian law provides alternatives to immediate liquidation for a
corporation in financial trouble. 93 Corporations typically favor voluntary
administration proceedings, 94 because the courts are not involved in the
initial stages of administration. 95 Appointing an administrator allows a
struggling company the best chance to continue its existence by emerging
from or avoiding insolvency. 96 In order to enter into voluntary
administration, a company must officially determine that it is either
insolvent or is likely to become insolvent,97 and that it needs the aid of an
administrator.98
Once a company is in voluntary administration, there are two
phases. 99 First, the administrator takes control of the company and its
affairs,100 acts as the company’s agent,101 and investigates what future plan
for the company will be in the creditors’ best interests.102 Second, within
twenty-one days of the beginning of the administration,103 the administrator
convenes a meeting of the creditors to determine whether the company

93
See, e.g., Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A (voluntary administration). Other jurisdictions
have similar alternatives to liquidation in an attempt to financially revive a corporation. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. ch. 11 (business reorganizations); see also AUSTL. L. REFORM COMM’N, REP. NO. 45: GENERAL
INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, CH. 3 (Dec. 1988) (considering the merits of other jurisdictions’ alternatives to
liquidation) [hereinafter Harmer Report]. The liquidation of a company under the Australian corporation
law is referred to as winding up. See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6 (Austl.).
94
See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.06(1).
95
See id.; DUNS, supra note 32, at 449-50. The other alternative to liquidation for corporations
under Australian insolvency law is a Scheme of Arrangement, where the debtor company enters into a
court-approved restructured set of agreements with its creditors in order to remain solvent. Corporations
Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.1 (Austl.).
96
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, § 435A (Austl.).
97
Insolvency under the Corporations Act of 2001 is defined as the inability to pay debts as they
become due. Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 1, pt. 1.2, div. 7, § 95A (Austl.); see also Paul B. Lewis, Trouble
Down Under: Some Thoughts on the Australian-American Corporate Bankruptcy Divide, 2001 UTAH L.
REV. 189, 191-92 (discussing the process of Voluntary Administration in more detail).
98
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, § 436A (Austl.); see also DUNS, supra note 32, at 449-50
(noting the fairly simple process by which an administrator is selected and Voluntary Administration
begins).
99
Lewis, supra note 97, at 192-93.
100
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, div. 3, § 437A (Austl.).
101
Id. § 437B.
102
Id. div. 4, § 438A. The administrator is charged with determining whether it would be in the
creditor’s interests for the company to form a plan of arrangement, for the administration to end, or for the
company to be wound up. Id. at (b).
103
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.3A, div. 5, § 439A (Austl.). The 21-day period is extendable
by court order. Id. at (6).
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should: 1) enter into an arrangement with the creditors, 2) exit
administration, or 3) be wound up.104
If the creditors vote that the corporation should be wound up, the
company begins the liquidation process by appointing a liquidator who then
collects as much money as possible to maximize the return to the company’s
creditors. 105 The liquidator has extensive control over the company and
exercises that control for the principal benefit of the company’s creditors,
subject only to the control of the court.106 The liquidator additionally may
bring legal proceedings in the company’s name.107
C.

Contractual Rights in Liquidation and Judicial Discretion

The liquidator’s control includes the right to collect any amount owed
to the company from counterparties under contract.108 The liquidator also
has the power to disclaim a contract.109 If the contract is for a lease or is
unprofitable, no court approval is required for the liquidator to disclaim the
contract.110 Other types of contracts can be disclaimed by obtaining court
approval. 111 When a court allows a contract’s disclaimer, the disclaimer
affects the other party’s rights only to the extent necessary to relieve the
disclaiming company from liability.112 The counterparty may then submit a
creditor claim against the company in liquidation for damages suffered as a
result of the effective disclaimer.113
104

Id. at § 439C.
See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.4B, div. 2, § 477 (Austl). The liquidator is to carry on the
business of the company as long as necessary in order to favorably collect and disburse the value from the
assets of the business. Id.
106
See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.04 (4)(b)(v)(B).
107
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.4B, div. 2, § 477 (2)(a) (Austl.).
108
See id. at (1)(a), (2)(ca); id. div. 3, § 483 (3)(a).
109
There are two key consequences of a disclaimed contract under the Corporations Act of 2001.
Enron v. TXU, (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 57. First, the company in liquidation is deprived of any right
to future performance upon the contract’s disclaimer. Second, the counterparty’s contractual rights are
unaffected by the contract’s disclaimer. See also Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd,
(2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12, pp. 23-24 (citing the case below and generally agreeing with the reasoning of J.
Austin).
110
See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(1A) (Austl.). The liquidator need only
sign a written disclaimer of the contract in question. Id. at (1).
111
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(h). The court may grant leave and “make
such orders in connection with matters arising under, or relating to the contract; as the Court deems just and
equitable.” Id. (1B).
112
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (Austl.). This acts to limit the scope of
the discretion of the courts in granting disclaimer of a contract that is not considered unprofitable. See
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 57; discussion infra Part
IV.
113
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(2) (Austl.).
105
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Unprofitable contracts are defined with substantial breadth. 114 The
Australian courts have recognized this breadth, in keeping with the
underlying policy goals of maximizing the return to a liquidating company’s
creditors in an expedient fashion.115 This policy conflicts with a liquidator’s
obligation to maximize returns for the creditors when a company in
liquidation is a party to a favorable, yet long-term contract that might require
performance over an extended period of time.116 The liquidator also carries
on the business of the company to the extent necessary to provide maximum
benefit the creditors. 117 Whether the temporal or financial goals take
precedence depends on the circumstances of the liquidation.118
The court has ultimate discretion to allow a disclaimer when a
liquidator seeks court approval to disclaim a contract. 119 It may impose
additional conditions upon the parties, or make orders regarding matters
“arising under, or relating to, the contract; as the Court considers just and
equitable.”120 While the language appears to grant substantial discretion to
the judiciary,121 the exercisable discretion remains limited by Section 568D,
and Division 7A of Part 5.6, in Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act of 2001,
which states that disclaimer does not affect any other party’s rights, “except
as far as necessary to release the company [in liquidation] and its property
from liability.”122
Liquidators have a duty to seek the maximum benefit for creditors
when winding up a company. 123 Courts have broad power in order to affect
this goal. 124 Judicial discretion is narrowed by the opposing goal of
completing the winding up process in a timely manner, and by a statutory
limitation that seeks to avoid judicially rewriting contracts.125
114
DUNS, supra note 32, at 239 (citing Dekala Pty. Ltd. (in liq.) v. Perth Land and Leisure Ltd.
(1989) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 664 (suggesting that a showing of monetary loss is not absolutely necessary to show
that a contract is unprofitable)).
115
See, e.g., Global Television Pty. Ltd. v. Sportsvision Australia Pty. Ltd. (in liq.) (2000) 35
A.C.S.R. 484, 496 (stating that a liquidator’s obligation is to realize income from assets and disburse them
to the creditors “at the earliest possible time”).
116
See id.
117
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.4B, div. 2, § 477(1)(a) (Austl.).
118
Whether a timely winding up is controlling over the liquidator’s duty to maximize the profits, or
vice versa, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For present purposes, it is enough to note these tensions
within Australian insolvency law.
119
See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(1B) (Austl.).
120
Id.
121
Enron Austl. (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12, para. 25.
122
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (Austl.); see discussion infra Part. IV.
123
See COLLIER INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, pt. 14.04 (4)(b)(v)(B).
124
See Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568(1B) (Austl.).
125
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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LIMITS ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION PREVENTED ENRON AUSTRALIA FROM
REALIZING THE BENEFIT OF THE SWAP CONTRACT

Enron Australia’s liquidators failed to realize money allegedly owed
under the Master Agreement.126 The liquidators sought court approval to
disclaim the swap contract with TXU, conditioned on the declaration of an
early termination date.127 Although the court’s decision resulted in a
windfall to TXU, the court properly recognized that it was without discretion
to grant the qualified disclaimer.128
A.

Enron Australia’s Liquidators Were Unable to Realize the Financial
Benefit of the Swap Agreement

On December 2, 2001, Enron Australia, a foreign subsidiary of Enron
in the United States, entered into voluntary administration as a result of
Enron’s now infamous financial collapse.129 On January 29, 2002, Enron
Australia’s creditors voted to place the company into liquidation.130 Enron
Australia had entered into an electricity swap agreement with TXU.131 The
parties memorialized their swap contract using the Master Agreement. 132
Under the agreement’s terms, 133 Enron Australia committed an event of
default when it entered into voluntary administration, and continued in
default when its creditors voted it into liquidation. 134 Under the Master
Agreement’s flawed asset provision, 135 TXU’s payment obligations were
suspended. 136 TXU also had the contractual right to declare an early
126

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
128
See infra Part IV.C.
129
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 2; see also
Interview by ceoforum.com.au with Paul Quilkey, former Managing Director, Enron Australia (Nov.
2002), at http://www.ceoforum.com.au/200211_ceoinsight.cfm [hereinafter Quilkey Interview] (discussing
the effects of Enron’s bankruptcy in the United States on the Australian subsidiary).
130
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 2; see supra Part III.B for the discussion of the
procedure from voluntary administration to liquidation.
131
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 5-7. There was also an agreement entered into by
Enron Australia with Yallourn Energy Pty. Ltd.; however, to the extent that these two agreements are
afforded similar treatment by the New South Wales Supreme Court, only the situation involving TXU will
be addressed in this Comment.
132
Id., para. 6; see supra Part II.
133
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(vii) (regarding an event of “bankruptcy” as an event of
default); see also supra Part II.B. (discussing the relevant events of default).
134
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 14. The appointment of an administrator constitutes
an event of default under Section 5(vii)(6), while Section 5(vii)(5) includes the winding-up or liquidation of
a company to be an event of default. 1992 Master Agreement, supra note 6, § 5(vii).
135
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 2(a)(iii)(1).
136
See discussion supra Part II.C.
127
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termination date as a result of Enron Australia’s default. 137 However,
terminating all outstanding transactions would result in TXU owing an
estimated net amount of $3.3 million (Austl.) to Enron Australia.138 TXU
had the option, but not the obligation, to declare an early termination date,
and subsequently chose not to exercise that option. 139 This left Enron
Australia’s liquidators with an unrealizable but active contract that
effectively held them in limbo.140
B.

Enron Australia’s Liquidators Sought a Partial Disclaimer of the
Swap Agreement

Enron Australia’s liquidators attempted to collect under the Master
Agreement by seeking leave of the court to disclaim the contract.141 The
liquidator’s argument relied on the Additional Termination Event provision
contracted by the parties 142 that entitled Enron Australia to set an early
termination date upon Enron’s satisfaction of all payment obligations, when
no future payment obligations to TXU remained.143 This situation would be
satisfied when all transactions entered into under the Master Agreement
expired. 144 Furthermore, the liquidators claimed that setting an early
termination date at that time would entitle them to payment of the accrued
net amount owed under TXU’s suspended payment obligation. 145 Enron
Australia’s liquidators advanced a unique argument in an effort to currently
realize the potential amount claimed to be owed by TXU.146 The liquidators
suggested that the provisions of the Corporations Act of 2001, which address
the disclaimer of contracts in liquidation, 147 allowed the judiciary
sufficiently broad discretion to give the court the power to approve the
disclaimer of the Master Agreement, while simultaneously issuing an order

137

1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(a).
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 8. This is the amount calculated by Enron Australia at
the commencement of the litigation discussed herein; see infra Part IV.B.
139
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 18-19.
140
See discussion infra Part V.
141
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 25.
142
See discussion of Additional Termination Events supra Part II.D.
143
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 21-22. These are the terms of the Additional
Termination Event that Enron Australia and TXU contracted for in Part 1(h) of the Schedule to the 1992
Master Agreement. Id.; see 1992 Schedule, supra note 6, pt. 1(h).
144
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 21.
145
Id., para. 23. But see discussion infra Part V.A.
146
Id.
147
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568 (Austl.).
138
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that had the identical effect of designating an Early Termination Date.148
This would allow Enron Australia to collect the net amount owed, as
calculated under the terms of the Master Agreement.149
The liquidators argued that: 1) under Section 568 of the Corporations
Act of 2001, the judiciary may grant the disclaimer of the Master
Agreement, thus relieving Enron Australia’s obligations under the
contract, 150 and 2) the judge additionally has the power to make the
supplemental order to effect an Early Termination Date under Section 568
(1B)(b) of the Corporations Act, as an order “in connection with matters
arising under, or relating to, the contract.”151
C.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales Correctly Decided the
Limitations on Judicial Discretion to Allow Contract Disclaimer

On December 24, 2003, Judge Austin, sitting in the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, heard Enron Australia’s liquidators’ arguments 152 and
determined that although the statutory language initially appeared to broadly
grant significant power to the judiciary, the words themselves were limited
by the context of the surrounding provisions.153 Judge Austin noted that if
the liquidators’ request were to be granted, it would effectively impose an
affirmative obligation on TXU that did not arise from the contractual terms,
thus altering the original terms contracted for by the parties.154 Furthermore,
the effect of the Section 568D(1) was held to clearly limit the extent to
which disclaimer may apply.155
The effect of Section 568D(1) limiting the application of disclaimer is
supported by a substantial body of case law156 which recognizes two key
148

Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 27-28.
See discussion of close-out netting supra Part II.B.
150
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 27.
151
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568 (1B)(b) (Austl.).
152
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 45-76. Enron’s liquidators’ support for their position
relied on the breadth given to the interpretation of the statutory language “in connection with” and “relating
to” in Section 568(1B)(b) of the Corporations Act of 2001, the increasing permissiveness of the allowance
of disclaimer through the legislative history, and the general legislative intent behind the allowance of
disclaimer for the purposes of winding up the company in an efficient and timely manner. Id.
153
Id., para. 40.
154
Id., para 41. The original terms would be altered by allowing Enron Australia to effectively
declare an early termination date when they are actively in default. Enron is thus not entitled to so declare
under the terms of the agreement. See supra Part II.C–D.
155
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (limiting the extent to which disclaimer
may affect the rights of other parties only to the extent necessary to relieve the disclaiming party from
liability); see supra Part III.C.
156
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 57.
149
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aspects of disclaimer. 157 First, it is generally accepted that disclaimer
deprives the disclaiming company of the right to future performance by the
counterparty.158 Second, the counterparty’s vested rights arising under the
contract are generally not to be affected by the disclaimer.159 In order to be
consistent with this precedent and give effect to Section 568D(1), Section
568(1B) cannot bestow so much power upon the court as to allow for the
imposition of an order not arising from the original contract the liquidators
seek to disclaim.160
Judge Austin further supported his decision by noting that limiting the
breadth of the statutory language is consistent with the general legislative
intent behind the disclaimer provisions in the Corporations Act of 2001.161
He indicated that the disclaimer’s purpose was to rid the company of
burdensome property in order to facilitate the company’s timely and efficient
liquidation. 162 The disclaimer provisions operate in detailed and specific
manners in order to facilitate this goal.163 Thus, the power to disclaim is
limited and not all-inclusive.164
On December 7, 2004, the New South Wales Court of Appeal heard
Enron Australia’s liquidators’ appeal. 165 The court unanimously affirmed
Judge Austin’s opinion, and directly adopted the lower court’s reasoning in
multiple passages.166 The liquidators’ argument was against the weight of
legal authority. Although the outcome is well-supported and appears to
follow the letter of the law, its effects create some inequities, at least to
157

Id.; see supra n. 109 and accompanying text.
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1) (disclaimer terminates the rights and
interests of the disclaiming party to the disclaimed property); see Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266,
para. 57 (citing authority).
159
Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 5, pt. 5.6, div. 7A, § 568D(1).
160
See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 58 (agreeing with TXU’s argument that the
liquidator’s proposed orders would alter TXU’s existing right not to declare an early termination date under
the Agreement, and is thus in conflict with Section 568D(1) of the Corporations Act of 2001).
161
See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, paras. 72-76 (citing Re Middle Harbour Inv. Ltd (in liq)
(No. 2) (1977) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 652, 657 (Austl.) (stating that the purpose of disclaimer is to rid the estate of
burdensome contracts in an effort to facilitate the timely administration of the bankruptcy estate)).
162
See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 76; see also Global Television (2000) 35 A.C.S.R.
484, 489 (noting the same).
163
Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 76.
164
Id.
165
See Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd, (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12. The three-judge
panel reviewed the decision of the Supreme Court to determine whether Judge Austin erred in construing
the scope of the statutory power of disclaimer conferred upon the court. Id. para. 5.
166
See, e.g., Enron Austl. (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12, paras. 23, 38 (citing opinion of Judge Austin,
below). Because the reasoning of the New South Wales Supreme Court was so heavily relied upon, present
discussion focuses on that court’s reasoning. The most relevant and significant reactions were to the
decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court’s decision. See infra Part V.
158
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Enron Australia’s creditors. 167 Although Enron Australia’s creditors in
liquidation were not parties to the electricity swap here at issue, the question
presents itself as to how much they knew about the Master Agreement’s
existence and terms contained therein, and how much Enron Australia’s inthe-money position affected the extension of credit and accompanying
terms.168
WIDESPREAD REACTION
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS

V.

BY

MARKET PRACTITIONERS EXPOSED

The decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court and the
subsequent affirmation by the Court of Appeal were well reasoned and
properly decided. The seeming windfall received by TXU as a result of
Enron Australia’s inability to collect the sums allegedly owed caught the
attention of many practitioners involved in corporate insolvency and
derivative instruments. 169 While the consensus remains that the decision
was legally sound, 170 the seeming inequity caused speculation as to the
effects and implications of the decision.171 A significant concern is whether
the basis of Enron Australia’s claim—that the Additional Termination event
would operate to allow Enron Australia to actually collect the amounts owed
by setting an Early Termination Date at the expiration of all the outstanding
transactions—was correct, thus eliminating the need for these
proceedings.172 Such a determination would only serve to underscore the
joint operation of the flawed assets provision and the non-defaulting party’s
167

The creditors were not parties to the Swap Agreement. It thus appears that the court was
balancing the equities of enforcing the model provisions of a valid contract, and allowing a windfall to
TXU, against the harm to the creditors of Enron Australia with regard to what is perhaps the poorly
understood operation of the terms of the 1992 Master Agreement. See infra Part V.B.
168
See infra Part V.C.
169
See, e.g., Walker & Usher, supra note 7 (citing the potential impacts of this decision, generally);
MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13 (discussing the lack of an impact of the decision under Canadian law).
170
See, e.g., Enron Austl. (2005) N.S.W.C.A. 12 (affirming the decision of the lower court);
Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the outcome is of minimal surprise).
171
Carter, supra note 13 (reporting that the Financial Services Authority of England asked the Bank
of England to review the Enron Australia ruling as to the potential impacts on financial institutions); see
Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that the Financial Markets Lawyers Group of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York is reviewing the potential outcome under U.S. law, and the financial regulatory
issues that may have been brought to light).
172
See MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 5; infra Part V.A. The New South Wales Supreme Court
followed this reasoning again when it determined Enron could designate an Early Termination Date under
the 1992 Agreement. Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. Yallourn Energy Pty Ltd (2005) N.S.W.S.C. 56,
para. 26. The main issues before the court involved the amount of interest payable by each party. Id., para.
11.
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power to indefinitely suspend the election of a termination date, which
would subversively cause the Master Agreement to operate contrary to the
language on its face. 173 In allowing the non-defaulting party to walk away
from its obligation, the outcome of this case is inconsistent with the Master
Agreement’s purpose and operation. While parties are generally indifferent
to how creditors are treated in the event of liquidation, this shifting of risk
will affect the relationship with both creditors and investors in the normal
course of business. 174
A.

Enron Australia’s Claim Was Based on a Faulty Assumption.

Enron Australia’s liquidators proposed that, under the terms of the
Additional Termination Event, Enron Australia would have the right to
declare an Early Termination Date upon the expiration of all of the
underlying transactions. 175 Enron Australia’s liquidators attempted (and
failed) to persuade the court that such funds, due as a result of this alleged
future right to realize the benefit of their position, should be currently
collected. 176 While their argument was soundly defeated, the underlying
presumption that they were entitled to the amount owed in the future is
flawed.177 The Additional Termination Event set forth by Enron Australia
and TXU was not originally contemplated to operate in the event that a nondefaulting party refused to make payments or set an Early Termination
Date. 178 The original purpose of the clause was to allow defaulting
purchasers of an option, who have fully performed payment obligations, to
obtain delivery despite the operation of the flawed asset provision.179
A closer look at Enron Australia’s liquidators’ attempted application of
the Additional Termination Event shows that this Additional Termination
Event clause was not contemplated to apply under these circumstances, and
would likely be ineffective in helping Enron Australia’s liquidators to realize
the benefit of any money owed. Upon the last outstanding agreement’s
expiration, the Additional Termination Event would allow Enron Australia to
173

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 21.
176
See supra Part IV.B.
177
MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 4-5. But see Yallourn (2005) N.S.W.S.C. 56, para. 12 – 26
(where the court again accepted, after cursory discussion, that the 1992 Agreement provided Enron
Australia with the contractual right to declare an Early Termination Date under the Additional Termination
Event in the Schedule to the 1992 Agreement).
178
CLAYTON UTZ, supra note 81.
179
Id.
174
175
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declare an Early Termination Date. 180 The amounts owed include the
“Unpaid Amounts” under the Master Agreement,181 which are defined with
respect to the “Terminated Transactions.”182 It is presumed that the election
of an Early Termination Date would, in fact, arise from Enron Australia’s
ongoing Event of Default. 183 Thus, only the transactions in effect
immediately before the declaration of an Early Termination Date would be
collectible.184 The ability to make that declaration, however, is conditioned
upon the expiration of each individual transaction (as the expiration of Enron
Australia’s payment obligations). There would be no transactions in effect
just before Enron Australia attempted to set an Early Termination Date.
Thus, under this reasoning, such an event would not give rise to any
payment obligation on the part of TXU. This result further demonstrates
that it was not likely contemplated by the parties to the Agreement, or their
creditors, that this Additional Termination Event was meant to apply on
these facts.
B.

The Master Agreement Contradicts the Purpose of the ISDA and the
Terms of the Master AgreementI.

Those pleased with the decision in the Enron Australia case were
happy that the terms of the Master Agreement could be enforced “as
written.”185 While this is true, the decision allowed the Master Agreement’s
180
See Enron Austl. (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266, para. 22; see discussion supra Part II.C-D for the
definition of these terms.
181
1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 14. Unpaid Amounts include the amount that becomes payable
before or as a result of the Early Termination Date, and is still unpaid. Id.
182
The 1992 Master Agreement defines “Terminated Transactions” as:
[W]ith respect to any Early Termination Date (a) if resulting from a termination event, all
Affected Transactions and (b) if resulting from an Event of default, all Transactions (in either
case) in effect immediately before the effectiveness of the notice designating that Early
Termination Date (or, if ‘Automatic Early Termination’ applies, immediately before that Early
Termination Date).
Id.
183
However, this is arguable. If it is treated as arising from the Additional Termination Event,
without reference to the Event of Default, then unpaid amounts would include all transactions, via the
definition of Affected Transactions. Affected Transactions are said to include all transactions, except in
limited circumstances that do not apply here. Id. Even if Enron might be entitled to payment eventually,
the delay in the liquidation process is significant and against one of the key underlying policies behind
Australian insolvency law, of providing an orderly process with the minimal delay and expense. Harmer
Report, supra note 93, pt. 1, § 2, para. 33. Furthermore, it is illogical for parties to intentionally allow the
terms of a contract to drag out the liquidation process, and would certainly be significant to the creditors of
a party under such an agreement.
184
MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 5.
185
See, e.g. Weinstein, et al., supra note 13, at 4 (noting the widespread positive reaction triggered by
this decision, that essentially enforced the contract as it was written).
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terms to act in tandem to undermine the contract as it was written. Although
a victory for freedom of contract ideologues, the outcome of this decision
exposed circumstances in which the actual effect of the Master Agreement
operates contrary to its underlying purpose.
The flawed asset provision in Section 2(a)(iii) of the Master
Agreement, operating in conjunction with the right of the non-defaulting
party to refrain from electing an Early Termination Date, effectively turns
the Second Method into the First Method by indefinitely relieving the nondefaulting party of any obligation to make payments or declare an Early
Termination Date.186 The First Method allows the non-defaulting party to
walk away from the agreement, since they have no obligation to repay the
defaulting party if they are owed money after electing an Early Termination
Date. 187 The Second Method disallows the non-defaulting party to walk
away by requiring that either party pay the net amount owed when the
transactions are closed out. 188 Unless Enron Australia’s liquidators were
entitled to recover funds under the Additional Termination Event, 189 they
would never collect on the amounts owed under the Swap Agreement. This
is also due to the fact that the Master Agreement has no termination date
itself, and thus the flawed asset provision operates indefinitely to prevent the
payment obligation of the non-defaulting party from arising. This
effectively turns an election of the Second Method—an election that
purports to disallow parties to walk away when they are found to have an
obligation in the event of an early termination—into an election of the First
Method, where the defaulting party has no hope of ever making a successful
recovery.
The New South Wales Court of Appeals’ decision exposed a
substantial term of the Master Agreement as an ineffective, illogical, and
inefficient flaw 190 that created a forced option for the liquidator of the
defaulting party to either disclaim the contract as a whole,191 or to extend the
liquidation proceedings for the sole purpose of potentially realizing the value

186
See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the choice of methods for determining payment in the
event of default under the Agreement).
187
See 1992 Agreement, supra note 6, § 6(e)(i).
188
See id.
189
See discussion supra part V.A.
190
Even in the event that Enron Australia is entitled to payment upon the termination of all of the
underlying transactions, the term still operates to draw out a contract that is not productive on anyone’s
account. See discussion supra Part V.A.
191
See supra Part III.C.
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of the contract at the termination of the attendant transactions.192 End users
of the Master Agreement have a strong interest in predictability of the
outcome of an event governed by the terms of a contract.193 Model contracts
from third parties, like statutes, should be efficiently drafted using clear
language, and thus render predictable outcomes. 194 The Enron Australia
decision causes the Master Agreement to fail the ISDA’s objective by
rendering the Second Method superfluous.
Swap arrangements documented by the Master Agreement are often
used to hedge a company’s interest in a particular market,195 and thus allow
the party to lower the risk of loss incurred in a sudden downturn in the
market or other financially tumultuous event.196 By using a swap agreement
as a hedging tool, the parties and their creditors reasonably expect that, in
the event of potential financial failure, the hedging party will have the
benefit of the hedge contract to offset some of the losses incurred.197
Prior to January 1, 2005, swaps were often carried off balance sheets,
only recognized by a note to the financial statement.198 Smaller creditors of
Enron Australia may not have known of the swap contracts under the Master
Agreement. These parties would normally bear the risk of debtor
insolvency. Enron Australia’s larger creditors may have been aware of, and
192

This is precisely what the liquidator of Enron Australia was attempting to do. Enron Austl. Fin.
Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266.
193
See discussion infra Part V.C.
194
This is particularly true for the ISDA, as one of its chief goals is to promote efficiency through
their documentation. ISDA Mission, supra note 18.
195
The use of swaps to hedge against risks in the markets of certain commodities such as electricity
are referred to as commodity swaps. KOLB, supra note 30, at 702-03. Derivative instruments are no longer
purely hedging instruments, and many investors now actively enter them as profit seeking investment and
financing devices. This may have been the case for Enron Australia. Cf. Quilkey Interview, supra note
129 (discussing the investing practices of Enron in the electricity market). In such an event, the
significance here of having the contract as an asset available in liquidation is increased. See discussion
infra note 197.
196
CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 650 (11th ed. 2006).
197
If there is expectation that the investment will create an asset for financing purposes, then there is
even more expectation on the part of the creditors that it would be available in the event of the party’s
insolvency and/or liquidation. There, it would not be used as a hedge against a particular risk of Enron
Australia, but would be a financing asset with an expected realizable value.
198
See IAS PLUS, STANDARDS: IAS 39, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm (showing the
history and amendment of IAS 39). This was likely the case for Enron Australia. Note that this was also
what got Enron into trouble in the first place – hiding related party transactions off the balance sheet. Floyd
Norris, Accounting Rules Changed to Bar Tactics Used by Enron, N.Y. TIMES, January 16, 2003, at C4. In
the United States, similar changes for derivative and hedge accounting have already gone into effect. See
generally, FINANCIAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO.
149 (2003) (amending Statement 133 so as to limit the instances when hedge accounting can be used, and
emphasizing disclosure and recognition of derivatives on the balance sheet), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas149.pdf.
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given access to, the derivative documentation. If that were the case, those
creditors should not have relied on the benefits of the Master Agreement in
the event of Enron Australia’s insolvency when deciding to extend credit.199
Under the revised International Accounting Standard 39 (“IAS 39”),
smaller creditors may improperly rely on the accounting for ISDA swap
agreements.200 On January 1, 2005, the amendments to IAS 39 went into
effect.201 Companies are now required to carry derivative contracts at their
fair value on the balance sheet. 202 Under these new standards, Enron
Australia would have carried the Master Agreement as a positive asset on the
balance sheet, though it was not realizable in liquidation. Creditors and the
investing public, who only have the financial statements to rely on, have
even more potential for unexpectedly bearing the risk of insolvency under
the amended standard. Creditors likely consider the existence of the swap
agreement with a positive value on the balance sheet when deciding whether
to extend credit.203 When parties cannot properly rely on assets carried on
the financial statements, the integrity of the financial statements becomes
less reliable.
The Master Agreement operates against the general expectations and
purpose of the ISDA where the in-the-money party is insolvent to provide a
stable and predictable swap contract. Enron Australia’s creditors most likely
reasonably expected that the benefits of the hedge contract would be
available to offset the losses suffered as a result of its insolvency and
subsequent liquidation. This is evidenced by the fact that this potential
ability for nonpayment is just now being recognized and enforced after years
of the Master Agreement’s use.204 Now that this operation in the Master
Agreement is exposed, parties to existing agreements are likely to enforce
this outcome more often.205 Of course, hedge contracts are usually designed
to protect the party against the risk incurred because of unexpected
199

See infra Part VI.A.
See IAS PLUS, STANDARDS: IAS 39, supra note 198.
201
Id.
202
INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS BD., IAS 39:FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND
MEASUREMENT, http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/8_63_ias39-sum.pdf. Fair value refers to
the price of the underlying item to the derivative instrument on the market on the date the balance sheet is
prepared. Id. To the extent that they are classified as an effective cash-flow hedge, the change in value is
held in a separate equity account until the gain or loss is realized through payment or sale. Id.
203
The issue is thus raised as to what extent this is the most accurate accounting method for an
agreement entered into under the 1992 Master Agreement, as it may not actually be available as an asset in
the event of the in-the-money party’s insolvency. See Walker & Usher, supra note 7, at 416.
204
Denis M. Forster, Defusing the Time Bomb Exposed by Enron Australia v. TXU, 25 No. 3
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2005).
205
See id. at 5 n. 21.
200
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fluctuations in the market of the commodity that is the subject of the swap
agreement, 206 as opposed to the general financial risk of the contracting
company. The creditors nonetheless may rely on the accounting for the
swap agreement as an asset on the balance sheet when determining whether
to extend credit.
C.

The Walk-Away Provision‘s Shifting of Risk Presents a Real Concern.

Both the party entering into a swap contract and that party’s creditors
expect that a swap agreement will operate as a hedging tool.207 Creditors
take a particular interest in a borrowing company’s credit exposure. 208
Derivative transactions in particular may be seen as potential assets available
in the event the debtor becomes insolvent or is otherwise unable to meet its
obligation. 209 When the benefit of the swap contract is unexpectedly
unavailable for the creditors’ benefit, as was the case for the creditors of
Enron Australia, the risk of loss under the swap agreement is shifted from
the two contracting parties to the creditors of the defaulting party.
If the creditors had the opportunity to give the swap agreement a close
vetting, and were in fact familiar with the terms of the Master Agreement,
then arguably the creditors themselves, as sophisticated parties, rightly bear
the risk of Enron’s default under the Master Agreement.210 It is likely that
most creditors reasonably relied on the characterization of the swap contract
in the financial statement notes, and had reason to believe that the amount
owed would become due in the event of liquidation.211 Enron Australia’s
creditors thus bore an unexpected risk under the Master Agreement.212
206

See generally STICKNEY & WEIL, supra note 196, at 489-91 (discussing basic accounting of
hedges). In the case of Enron Australia and TXU’s arrangement, the value of the swap agreement was tied
to the price of electricity. Enron Austl. Fin. Pty Ltd (in liq.) v. TXU Elec. Ltd (2003) 48 A.C.S.R. 266,
para. 6.
207
See discussion supra Part V.B. To the extent that the Swap Contract appears as a positive asset on
the debtor’s balance sheet, the creditors are presumed to reasonably rely on that asset in their decisions as
to whether, and on what terms, to extend credit to the debtor.
208
See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1049 (noting that the credit risk of parties to swap agreements is
especially of concern in the event of parties to OTC derivative transactions).
209
See Bergman, et al., supra note 14, at 16 (stating that in the event of a bank’s insolvency and a net
in-the-money position under a swap agreement, the termination payment would be an asset of the insolvent
bank available for the depositors thereof); supra Part V.B.
210
Whether Enron Australia, as a sophisticated party to the contract, should itself be responsible for
the understanding of the operation of the 1992 Master Agreement in the event of its liquidation, and the
appropriateness of accounting for the swap contract, are issues additionally raised by the outcome of this
case.
211
See supra Part V.B.
212
Enron Australia itself bore some responsibility to understand the effect of insolvency on the swap
contract, and to thereby communicate the potential outcome in the notes accompanying its financial
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This unexpected shifting of the loss has potentially serious
consequences in the marketplace, as creditors are unable to consider the
potential inability to collect during insolvency at the time that they extended
credit to the debtor. The fact that the benefits of the contract would not be
available might realistically affect either the terms attached to the credit
extended,213 or whether credit should be extended in the first place. This is
another example under the Master Agreement where the actual outcome
does not conform to the expected result, thus demonstrating that the
compromised predictability and clarity of the Agreement has second-order
consequences.
This unanticipated transfer of risk to the creditors of the defaulting
party gives rise to concerns for the potential of systemic risk. 214 By
transferring the risk of loss outside of the immediate contractual relationship,
the level of risk is less likely to be subject to quantitative measurement, thus
hampering the ability of the parties to assess and accommodate their
exposure. As a result, the default of an in-the-money party under a swap
agreement governed by the Master Agreement215 could prevent owed funds
from being available to pay the obligations under another swap contract and
shift the risk to a third party. The third party might become insolvent as a
result of this lost asset. This could subject the creditors of the third party to
the similar disappointed expectations as a result of the Master Agreement,
thus creating a domino effect of risk transfer and default. While this
doomsday scenario is remote,216 the consequences of the potential risks are
indeed tangible.217

statements. This raises the more general question of to what extent, if any, third party drafters of contracts
should be liable for adverse outcomes under their model contract. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
213
Examples include: the interest rate attached to the debt, other payment terms such as the time for
repayment, required principal payments, etc. It is enough to consider here that these terms would be
considered and affected by the level of risk that the creditor deems associated with a particular debtor, as
well as the availability (or absence) of certain assets, when determining the overall level of risk attached to
the debtor.
214
Walker & Usher, supra note 7. In the event that there is a fairly enclosed market, with a set
number of participants engaged in an inter-related web of derivative contracts, the transfer of risk has the
potential to create a domino effect of risk and loss transfer, which is systemic risk. See Bergman et al.,
supra note 14, at 30.
215
Where the insolvent party is unable to collect under the agreement in circumstances similar to
those in Enron Australia. See supra Part IV.
216
See generally Craig H. Furfine, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion, J.
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING, Vol. 35, No. 1, Feb. 2003, at 111 (concluding that the systemic failure of
banks is generally unlikely).
217
See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1056-57 (recognizing that although unlikely, it is easy to envision
a chain-reaction of defaults, illiquidity of the derivatives, and panicked-driven selling).
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Market practitioners recognized the particular risks to regulated
financial institutions that engage in credit derivative swaps under the Master
Agreement regarding netting and capital adequacy requirements.218 Whether
the operation of the provisions as demonstrated by the Enron Australia case
is significant enough to affect regulation of financial institutions is not yet
clear.219 However, this parallels concerns about the proper accounting for
swap contracts with regard to the disclosure and valuation of assets, and the
risks of recognizing those assets upon liquidation.
Beyond the complete collapse of a local market, the increased and
uncertain risk may create certain compensatory upward adjustments. For
example, the benefit of swap agreements as a potential asset will be limited.
Credit will be extended more conservatively, and applicable rates will
increase as a result of the increased risk borne by those extending credit to
parties engaged in transactions under the Master Agreement. The higher
cost of credit to companies engaging in the sale of a commodity could result
in the overall increase of prices for the underlying commodity itself, which
elicits a greater social interest for the impact on end-consumer markets.
VI.

THE ISDA SHOULD RESPOND TO THE CONCERNS OF THE MARKET AND
FULFILL ITS SELF-PROCLAIMED GOALS

The outcome of the Enron Australia decision triggered a rapid
response across globe from practitioners who work with swaps and
derivatives instruments. 220 The private market has proven its ability to
recognize, respond, analyze, and adjust to new and unexpected outcomes in
light of this case. The very ability of the private market to be this aware and
responsive may itself be sufficient for users of the Master Agreement to
consider the potential effect exposed by the Enron Australia decision.
Future negotiation of swap and derivative agreements memorialized by the
Master Agreements will include a deeper consideration of the insolvency of
an in-the-money party.
Although market participants were initially reactive, the outcome of
the Enron Australia decision must be addressed by the ISDA in order to
protect against the Master Agreement operating in a similar fashion without
prior consideration by the contracting parties. The ISDA has an ethical
obligation, if not a legal one, to ensure that the outcomes under its model
218
219
220

See supra note 17.
Forster, supra note 204 at 4; MCMILLAN BINCH, supra note 13, at 3-4.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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agreements are foreseeable and that the provisions operate without
subversive interactions. The ability of the private market to be flexible in
adapting to new circumstances is a powerful one, and no legislation is
required to resolve this situation.
A.

Private Market Participants and the ISDA Are Best Equipped to
Address the Operation of the Master Agreement.

The private markets in local and international swap and derivative
practice have shown an expeditious and reactive ability in response to the
outcome of the Enron Australia decision. 221 Some of the reaction has
extended beyond the private rule makers to governmental inquiries.222 The
private market participants and private market regulators, such as the ISDA,
are best equipped to efficiently address the interaction of the terms of the
Master Agreement exposed by the Enron Australia decision. Enron
Australia’s liquidation has brought the interplay of the flawed asset
provision and the right of the non-defaulting party not to elect an early
termination date to the attention of the swap and derivative market
participants. Thus, the parties to such agreements will recognize the
operation of the Master Agreement to provide a windfall to a non-defaulting
party to the expense of the creditors of the defaulted party. It is likely that
both parties will consider the importance of the contract with regard to the
price and obtainment of credit,223 and will give sufficient weight to how the
swaps are accounted for and disclosed to creditors. The availability of the
contract in the event of financial turmoil of the company might well be
important enough to induce parties to contract around the outcome of the
Enron Australia decision. Currently, however, there are many open
contracts entered into under the 1992 Master Agreement.224 Counterparties
to insolvent in-the-money parties will now try to enforce the contracts as
written to avoid payment, similar to TXU. 225 In order to minimize the

221

Id.
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 13 (noting that the Bank of England’s Financial Markets Law
Committee was reviewing the impact of the Enron Australia decision on regulation of capital netting for
regulated financial institutions).
223
See discussion supra Part V.C.
224
TEN THEMES, supra note 18, at 2 (“The most widely used agreement in the OTC derivatives
markets is currently the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement . . . .”).
225
See Forster, supra note 204, at 5.
222
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potential risks from this behavior, 226 the ISDA should amend the Master
Agreement to prevent this subversive operation for future transactions.
B.

The ISDA Is Obligated to Consider Another Option.

The ISDA, as a third-party drafter, has an ethical obligation to
maintain predictability and explicit operation of the model agreements. The
parties that use the Model Agreements to enter into derivative contracts are
generally sophisticated.227 Thus, parties should have the ability to vet the
model agreement in utilizing the agreements as contracts. However, the
ISDA has, by the very nature of the organization, taken on a role of fostering
and maintaining systemic stability.228 While there may be no legal liability
of the ISDA to address the operation of the Master Agreement in this
instance, the ISDA has a professional and ethical responsibility to the market
and its participants to provide a contract that operates as each of the
available options purport to on their face. This can easily be accomplished
by altering the model agreement.
The ISDA has indicated that the outcome of the Enron Australia
decision is desirable, and even expected. 229 However, the question still
remains as to why the Master Agreement would purport to allow for the
choice of the Second Method, when there are subversive situations where
the terms of the Agreement operate to render it all but ineffective.230 The
ISDA released the 2002 version of the Master Agreement in order to update
the agreement to current market practices.231 The ISDA removed the First
Method, which allowed for a non-defaulting party to walk away from any
obligation to the defaulting party as an available option under the contract.232
This indicates a clear intention to move away from allowing a party to walk
226

See supra Part V.A-B.
But see Waldman, supra note 14, at 1035 (questioning whether such parties as local school
districts and municipalities are of sufficient sophistication to utilize derivatives). To the extent that any
financially unsophisticated parties utilize the Master Agreements, real issues of obligations arise as to legal
liability of third party drafters as providing legal services. See, e.g., Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the
Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121
(2000) (discussing the obligations of Nolo Press for providing model legal documents to generally
unsophisticated consumers).
228
See ISDA Mission, supra note 18.
229
Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 4 (quoting general counsel of ISDA).
230
See supra Part V.B.
231
See AAR, supra note 13 (noting that the 2002 Master agreement removes the First Method as an
option, and the same outcome would have occurred if Enron Australia’s Swap Agreement had been
governed by the 2002 Agreement).
232
Id.
227

FEBRUARY 2006

AUSTRALIAN INSOLVENCY LAW

263

away from the agreement. By leaving the interaction of the flawed asset
provision with the Second Method unaddressed, however, the ISDA
continues to allow for the effects of the First Method to remain in the event
of factual circumstances similar to those of Enron Australia.233
In order to put the effects of the First Method election properly to rest,
the ISDA should adopt a compulsory termination date, with a flexible
amount of time for parties to determine whether such an election is prudent.
This will give greater transparency to the potential outcomes under the
contract, allow greater certainty to the parties as to what they are bargaining
for, and protect unknowing parties from an inequitable outcome such as that
in Enron Australia.
A practical alternative to current the Master Agreement, which will rid
the agreement of the lingering ability of a party to walk away from its
obligation under the contract, can be found by looking to another derivative
instrument. The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) has a model contract for use
in utilities markets.234 The EEI Master Contract avoids the potential for the
non-defaulting party to be able to walk away from its obligation. The EEI
allows for the suspension of payments for ten business days upon an event of
default, and provides the non-defaulting party the option to declare an early
termination date during the period of suspended payment.235 Thus, there is
some flexibility for the non-defaulting party, while providing certainty that
the contract will expire at some point in time.
Currently, under the ISDA Master Agreement, the only other option
open to the parties is to elect for an Automatic Termination Date to apply.236
The option put forth by the EEI suggests that there can be a balance of
certainty and flexibility. While the length of time could certainly be variable
and negotiated between the parties to the agreement, it would provide a
greater certainty to the fate of the parties under the agreement, and greater
confidence to the creditors of the respective parties that the benefit of the
agreement will be available in the event of insolvency or liquidation.

233
This is assuming that Enron would not, in fact, ever be able to declare an early termination date
under the Additional Termination Event contracted for. See supra Part V.A.
234
Edison Electric Institute, Master Power Purchase & Sale Agreement (2000), available at,
http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/legal_and_business_practices/master_contract/contract0004.pdf
[hereinafter EEI Agreement]. See generally Andrew S. Katz, Using the EEI-NEM Master Contract to
Manage Power Marketing Risks, 21 ENERGY L. J. 269 (2000) (discussing the terms and operation of the
EEI Model Agreement).
235
EEI Agreement, supra note 234, art. 5, § 5.7; Katz, supra note 234, at 291.
236
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Enron Australia decision exposed an inconsistency in the 1992
ISDA Master Agreement. It also showed how quickly market participants
are capable of reacting to the unexpected operations of the Master
Agreement’s provisions. The market’s ability to identify problems under the
agreement should be harnessed to improve the Master Agreement’s terms.
Greater transparency of the effect of the flawed asset provision and the
election of the Second Method will provide predictable outcomes consistent
with the expectation of the parties to the agreement. Thus, the parties will
be able to negotiate for outcomes that correspond to their underlying
interests with particular regard to the terms and cost of financing.
Furthermore, by providing for terms with greater certainty in the Master
Agreement, the risks to third parties can be contained, and the potential for
systemic risk kept at a minimum.
When a regulatory responsibility is taken up by a private organization
such as the ISDA, there exists a responsibility on the part of the organization
to the end users of the model forms to provide documentation that is in line
with their leading role in the development of privately negotiated derivative
instruments. In light of this responsibility, it is necessary for the ISDA to
address the compromised clarity and purpose of the contract by 1) giving
notice to the parties in the marketplace so that they can contract around the
provisions, and 2) amending the provisions in the Master Agreement so that
the default rules will avoid giving rise to the unexpected outcome, thereby
making the risk more ascertainable and addressable.
Additional concerns remain. Most importantly, accounting authorities
must elucidate the appropriate accounting for the swap agreements.
Otherwise, reliance arguments and allegations of misleading accountings are
likely to be raised and litigated. Also, financial regulatory authorities must
clarify whether financial institutions and capital adequacy requirements are
affected by this case. Finally, it is necessary to consider the accountability
of organizations that take on a role of responsibility in the promotion and
fostering of markets. Sophisticated market practitioners and participants
must rely on their own instincts and analysis to catch the next volatile
reaction before it happens.

